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In this paper we assess the properties of scale-free endogenous
growth models in presence of use costs for the ¯nal users. As bench-
mark we use Segerstrom(2000) two R&D sector model. When use costs
apply to both types of innovation we ¯nd counterintuitive results with
respect to the standard Endogenous Growth literature: use costs can
increase growth. This is due to the presence of both increasing returns
in the research functions and the population growth condition. When
costs apply to vertical innovations only we can establish more intuitive
results: under mild conditions use costs decrease the rate of vertical
innovation and of overall economic growth.
Key words: Endogenous Growth, Scale e®ect, Adoption costs
JEL Classi¯cation: O32,O41.
1 Introduction
In order to cope with the so called \scale e®ect puzzle" which character-
izes standard R&D based endogenous growth models, the recent literature
(Howitt(1999), Segerstrom(2000) Cozzi and Spinesi(2002)), has introduced
models displaying at the same time horizontal and vertical innovation.
Jones (1995) underlines the fact that \scale e®ect" is one of the most
striking features of endogenous growth models: an increase in the level of
population leads to an increase in the growth rate of the economy1. If a
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1For a short discussion of the di®erent de¯nitions of \Scale E®ect", as they enter in
the literature the reader is referred to Jones(1999)
1constant growth rate of population is allowed, the model looses any balanced
growth path.
All empirical studies reject the hypothesis of scales e®ects as simply coun-
terfactual: for example, despite the fact that the number of engineers devoted
to R&D have continuously risen after the second world war, there is no evi-
dence of a systematic rise in the economies growth rate in that period2.
In the new stream of literature two related ingredients are essential in
order to cope with population growth. The ¯rst is the so called \population
growth condition" which relates the innovation growth rates with popula-
tion growth; the second is the speci¯cation of the returns of the research
production functions.
Howitt(1999) assumes a set-up in which the growth rate of horizontal
innovation is equal to population growth and he assumes that vertical inno-
vations have constant returns to scale i.e. linearity in the input term applies.
Segerstrom(2000) generalizes the framework to the case of any return in the
two innovations. By doing this he introduces increasing returns in the re-
search functions. His \population growth condition" implies that population
growth is related to a linear combination of both types of innovation.
Both models capture the essential feature of Segerstrom(1998): vertical
innovations become more and more di±cult as far as better intermediate
varieties are introduced. This requires that along the balanced growth path
more and more resources should be devoted to R&D in order to have a
constant growth rate. With respect to one R&D sector models, two sectors
of research can prevent the arousal semi-endogenous growth problem, that is
growth rates are uniquely determined by population growth.
Segerstrom (2000) shows that the hypothesis of two di®erent technolo-
gies in the R&D processes can be used to understand how subsidies to R&D
can imply di®erent policy results, depending on some parameters, including
the fact that subsidies can produce a reduction in the growth rate of the
economies. With this respect the model of Segerstrom, in his full general-
ity, does not provide any conclusion about desirability of the two types of
innovation, leaving the question to be eventually solved on empirical grounds.
In this paper we study some extensions of scale-e®ect free models by in-
troducing use costs for the ¯nal users in the two R&D sector model proposed
by Segerstrom (2000). The gist of employing use costs is that ¯nal good ¯rms
cannot appropriate the full productivity of the new quality goods but must
drop some fraction of ¯nal output.
The concept of use costs is closely related with the one of adoption costs
and it is well known that adoption costs are a very signi¯cant part of expen-
2Reported in Jones 1995
2diture in modern economies: Jovanovic(1997) reports the ¯gure of a 10% of
GDP expenditure in adoption costs.
The economic intuition behind use cost is that high quality intermediate
goods need resources to be run. The case of Personal Computer and Networks
is striking, in the sense that a battery of technicians is needed in order to aid
people use the computers and run a network: moreover this kind of cost do
not dissipate once an adoption period has elapsed.
For the sake of simplicity we do not directly model use costs as an alloca-
tion problem of labor but we will directly assume that use costs permanently
reduce the productivity of intermediate varieties by a fraction z. This as-
sumption keeps the model as simple as possible and it is in line with the
assumption that research is conducted by the use of ¯nal goods.
As a matter of comparison we implement two di®erent kind of costs:
simple and quasi-¯xed costs. Simple costs reduce the productivity of inter-
mediate goods and are paid on all varieties, whereas quasi-¯xed costs are
paid in terms of the same fraction of lost productivity, but only with re-
gards on those varieties that have an increase in productivity attached to
them. The latter hypothesis implies that new varieties, ceteris paribus, will
be demanded more by ¯nal users, giving then more incentives to undertake
horizontal rather than vertical research.
In standard endogenous growth models, see Romer(1990) or Aghion-
Howitt(1992), the result of an increase in simple use costs would be straight-
forward: less productive intermediate goods imply a lower demand by the
¯nal good producers and therefore less pro¯ts for the innovative monopo-
lists. This in turn drives down the innovation e®ort of the research sector
and therefore reduces the growth rate of the economy.
Quite surprisingly we ¯nd that in Scale E®ect free models we might not
observe this behaviour. When we implement simple costs in Segerstrom's
(2000) two R&D sector model, we observe that the e®ort in both kind of
innovation will be reduced but if the returns of horizontal innovation decrease
at a slower pace than the returns in vertical innovation, then simple costs
increase the growth rate of vertical research. This may or may not lead to
an increase in economic growth, per capita income, according to the value of
some parameters.
A more intuitive result applies in the reverse case. When returns to the
vertical research decrease more slowly than returns in the horizontal inno-
vation, the fraction of GDP devoted to both kind of research are decreased,
but the growth rate in varieties is fostered and the growth rate in quality is
reduced. Despite this the overall growth rate of the economy, measured by
the growth rate of wages, could still be improved.
After providing an explanation for this behaviour, we analyze the quasi-
3¯xed cost case: we ¯nd that the growth rate of vertical innovation is always
decreased by quasi-¯xed costs. Given the higher incentive in undertaking
horizontal research, the rise in the horizontal growth rate of innovation is
associated with an increased fraction of resources devoted to horizontal re-
search at the expenses of vertical research. Whatever the returns of inno-
vations, quasi ¯xed costs decrease the vertical innovation rate by harming
the growth rate of productivity and reduce the overall growth rate of the
economy.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First we want to address the ques-
tion of use/adoption costs in two sector R&D models and discuss the issue of
counterintuitive growth enhancing use costs in Segerstrom(2000): we propose
quasi-¯xed costs as solution to cope with this problem. Second, by propos-
ing a quasi-¯xed cost argument, we also take a stand on the relation between
horizontal or vertical innovation in theoretical models. That is, using a quasi
¯xed cost assumption, we obtain the result that horizontal innovation is a
\cheaper" but less e®ective innovation with respect to quality innovation.
Section 2 contains a (brief) review of Segerstrom (2000); in 3 we intro-
duce a simple cost assumption in the model and in 4 we discuss the quasi
¯xed case in intuitive terms by leaving the proofs to the Appendix. Some
conclusions follow.
2 The benchmark model
We use Segerstrom (2000) as a benchmark model. We have a three sector
economy: ¯nal good producers, intermediate goods producers and the re-
search sector. Final goods can be consumed or used in research, there is no
capital. The representative ¯nal good ¯rm uses a production function which









Embedded in the production function there are two (three) possibilities
of growth: a vertical innovation can increase the productivity parameter Ait
and horizontal innovation will expand the measure of industries up to Nt. It
is assumed that total labor force grows at a constant exogenous rate gL.
Research is conducted by means of ¯nal goods only: there is no labor.
This leads to the same market clearing condition in the goods market for
both models: ¯nal goods can be used for consumption Ct, vertical Vt and
horizontal Ht.
4Yt = Ct + Vt + Ht (2)
In looking at the steady state of our economy we will be interested in the
constant level of ratios Ht=Yt and Vt=Yt
3.















The demand of intermediate goods will be such that their price is equal
to their marginal productivity. Labor will also be chosen as according to his














Intermediate varieties are treated as a bundle of commodities produced
by ¯rms under Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition with the use of labor
only according to the technology:
xit = Lit
Skipping the details we can conceive the model as composed of two blocks:
a ¯rst block dealing with ¯nal and intermediate good ¯rms, whose structure
we have just described, and the second block dealing with research and de-
velopment. According to Li(2000), in endogenous two sector R&D models
the two blocks are interdependent whereas in semi-endogenous growth the
growth rates of the economy can be derived from the research block only. In
the latter case, subsidies will be irrelevant for economic growth.















By log-di®erentiating we have the so called population growth condition:
gL = (d ¡ 1)gA + ®gN (5)
3This is in Segerstrom, but for example Howitt de¯nes di®erent stationary variables:
as a result he gets that the sum (H + V )=Y has to be constant in steady state.
5In the same way, solving for the wage and log-di®erentiating we get that the
wage rate grows according to iso-growth condition:
gw = (1 ¡ ®)gN + gA (6)
For the second block (research)we have the following structure. We are
in a tournament model where the winner of R&D race takes the industry
as a monopolist: there is free entry in research. The probability Át of hav-
ing a vertical innovation in each industry is described as the instantaneous
















This formulation generalizes Howitt(1999) by allowing for decreasing re-
turns in the fraction of GDP v for the vertical innovation process. Using the
law of large numbers, at the economy level, the growth process of leading
edge productivity At can be described as:
gA = ¸v¾v
±y (8)
In order to get a constant growth rate level of vertical innovation, Á must
be constant in steady state. From the resource constraint we know that
both H=Y ´ h and V=Y ´ v are constant over time. We can then deduce
that y ´ Y=AdN will be constant in the balanced growth path. Function 8
expresses the fact that with spillovers (y) a decrease in the fraction of GDP
allocated to vertical research (v) can be (more than) compensated by an
increase in the steady state value of stationarized income. This feature,
although not underlined in Segerstrom(2000) is one of the key properties of
the model, and it is due to the fact that although the research process has
decreasing returns in v only, it shows increasing returns in v;y.
The rate of growth for horizontal di®erentiation is given by the same kind










And the long run rate of horizontal innovation:
gN = ¸hh
°y (10)
6In the solution of the model it is useful to distinguish between two cases:
whether research for the vertical sector decrease at a faster pace than in the
horizontal case, i.e. ° > ± or if the contrary holds. The solution technique
does not change much.
For both kinds of di®erentiation, the innovator will enjoy some monopoly
power, the only di®erence in the reward being given by the hypothesis that
new industries will produce intermediate goods of productivity Ait that is
randomly assigned to them among the existing ones. Therefore we will have




As in all schumpeterian models the reward of discoveries, ¦h and ¦v,
are computed by the perpetual monopolistic rent in each industry, taken
into account the well known replacement e®ect. In multi-industry models we
take into account also the so called \crowding out e®ect", the perpetual rise
of wage costs due to technological progress, see Cabellero and Ja®e(1993).
3 First extension: the simple cost model
We introduce a permanent cost that changes the demand for intermediate
goods and therefore a®ects the incentives to undertake R&D. The gist of
employing use costs is that ¯nal good ¯rms cannot appropriate the full pro-
ductivity of the new quality goods but must drop some fraction of ¯nal
output.
Use costs will be an increasing function of the number of workers us-
ing the new technology, of the demanded intermediate goods and of their






By taking constant returns to scale we can simplify our story by assuming
that the cost function has the same exponents as the production function.















As a result we get that use costs are a fraction of ¯nal output.
When we introduce use costs it is easy to see that the equilibrium wage
is a®ected as follows:
w
costs = (1 ¡ z)wt
7with costs the wage is reduced by a ¯xed proportion z: the iso-growth line
will not be a®ected.






Ait®(1 ¡ z) (12)









Equations 12 and 13 together imply that the equilibrium price will be
given, as before, by: p = w=®. In general we obtain that:
Proposition 1 With simple costs the wage-general equilibrium e®ect on in-
termediate goods leaves their production unchanged.
This result is easily checked in equation 13: once the general equilibrium
e®ect on the wage is taken into account, the optimal quantity produced by
the intermediate ¯rms is unchanged by the introduction of the use costs. The
cut in wage compensates the reduction of ¯nal users demand.
This implies that the market clearing equation of the labor market is




Also the output of the ¯nal ¯rms will drop also according to the ratio
1 ¡ z.
Y
costs = (1 ¡ z)Y
Therefore we will have the following result:
Proposition 2 In the simple cost case both the iso-growth line and the pop-
ulation growth condition are una®ected.
The pro¯t of the intermediate ¯rm which innovates in the vertical dimen-




















it = (1 ¡ z)¼
Despite the reduction in pro¯ts, simple costs do not give any incentive
to undertake more horizontal research. The incentive e®ect for research is in
fact contained in one key equation:
¦ht = E[(Ait=At)
1=1¡®]¦vt (14)
4With a star we indicate the optimal values
8When we introduce simple costs, every ¯rm, including the new industries
that enter the market, will make the ¯nal good ¯rm pay the use costs. What
happens is that both ¦h and ¦v will be reduced by a factor 1 ¡ z. The two
reductions cancel out in the equation above.
Therefore simple use costs do not alter the behaviour of research toward
devoting more resources to horizontal innovation, rather than to vertical:
they are neutral from an incentive viewpoint.
3.1 The case ° > ±
For the sake of shortness, we omit all the (straightforward) computations
and we directly comment on the ¯nal result. We start from the case where
° > ±, i.e. the returns in vertical innovation decrease with a faster pace than
the returns in the horizontal.
gL = gA(d ¡ 1 + ®c1v
²) (15)
½ ¡ gL = gA
µ












The second equation represents an arbitrage condition between vertical
and horizontal innovation: it is derived from equation 14 by plugging in
the expression of pro¯ts and making use of the research functions. In square
brackets we highlight the wedge in the research condition, (1¡z), introduced
by the simple costs.
The following ¯gure shows what happens under the hypothesis that the
vertical innovation is more growth enhancing than the horizontal one. The
contour lines represent the iso-growth lines: we are in the case d < 1=1 ¡ ®.
For higher levels of the iso-growth line there will be more growth in the
economy.
When we have costs, the R&D condition, see equation 16, will move
upwards, in the opposite direction to the case of a positive subsidy studied
by Segerstrom5.
From the population growth condition
gL = (d ¡ 1)gA + ®gN
we know that it is impossible for growth rates of both innovations to grow,
or to be reduced, at the same time, population growth being constant. The
5The ¯gures are drawn for a speci¯c choice of parameters, the qualitative results hold
independently of the speci¯c choice









Figure 1: Solution of the system for simple costs
existence of a steady state implies that, when ° > ±, gN declines and gA rises:
this is only possible if the steady state value of y has increased.
Taking a dynamical perspective, at the beginning both rates of innova-
tion will decrease, thus violating the population growth condition. Then
since both productivity and industry measure growth rates under-perform
the population growth condition, the steady state income will increase since,
we remind, y / Lt
A1¡dN®. The increase of the steady state income increases in
turn the spillover to research, up to the point in which the vertical innovation
is higher than before and the horizontal innovation is reduced6.
Even if the fraction of GDP devoted to vertical research decreases and
there is a boost in vertical innovation, this does not mean that the amount of
resources to vertical research decreases, but simply that it increases but this
is more than o®set by the increase in GDP: i.e. v = V=Y and the numerator
V grows less than the denominator7.
6This interpretation, although not explicitly expressed by the author, holds also for the
case of uniform subsidies in the original paper of Segerstrom(2000)
7An intuition for this claim runs as follows. Suppose that in order to match the popu-
lation growth condition an increase in gA of 1% implies a reduction of v of 1%. Then we
know that gA = v±y¾¸: Imagine ± = 0:4. The increase in y should be of 1 + 0:4 = 1:4 in
order for gA to have a 1% growth. Now let us consider the fraction v = V=Y , for sure Y
10Finally the growth rates of innovation that are compatible with popula-
tion growth must be matched with the iso-growth line gw = (1¡®)gN +gA to
determine whether the overall economy growth rate is increased or reduced:
since gN is reduced and gA is increased, a rise in use costs can either be
growth enhancing or growth reducing. The same rule as in Segerstrom(2000)
applies: when d < 1=1 ¡ ®, i.e. the population growth line is steeper than
the iso-growth line, costs are growth enhancing.
Our result is at odds with economic intuition: in the presence of costs,
our ¯ctitious economy can have an higher steady state income and therefore
higher growth rates. This feature is not shared by neo-schumpeterian mod-
els, where the decline in productivity associated with use costs would simply
reduce the growth rate of both productivity and income. The result is due to
two features in our model that are not shared by the others: the downward
sloping population growth condition, which is likely to be an important com-
ponent of all scale-free endogenous growth model, and the increasing returns
of the R&D functions with respect to the share of GDP and the steady state
income.
As we discuss in the section 3.3, the issue does not arise if we stick to the
case when the returns of vertical innovation decrease at a lower pace than the
returns in the vertical, i.e. ± > °, which is the case in the paper of Howitt:
nevertheless if we do not stick exactly to the framework of Howitt(1999),
where the horizontal innovation is constrained to be equal to the population
growth, we might still have the case of overall growth enhancing use costs.
The other possibility, if we do not want to restrict ourselves to the case
± > °, is to change the cost function by implementing quasi-¯xed costs: this
issue is discussed in section 4.
3.2 Extension: z is function of the vertical innovation
growth rate
Just for the sake of simplicity we have assumed so far that z is a pure number:
but nothing would change if we assumed this fraction to be an appropriate
function of the vertical growth rate.
Consider now z(gA) as a positive function of the growth rate of innova-




cannot grow less than his steady state value y, in order for v to decrease only of the 1%
there must be some increase also in V .
11The faster the technical progress the higher will be the ratio of production
busted by costs: also when there is no innovation there is no cost, a logical
consequence. By choosing a cost function which is related to the \amount to
be learned" in the literature on learning, we can introduce a reasonable use
cost8.
In the literature of \learning curves" it is assumed that new technologies
are not fully productive as soon as they are adopted. Productivity A evolves
over time according to learning by doing as for example Aeffective
¿ = A¿(1 ¡
z¤e¡¸¿)1¡¯. At time zero the amount to be learned is de¯ned as 1¡(1¡z¤)1¡¯:
given the absence of learning by doing in our model, if we assume ¯ = 0 we
fall back to our case. Productivity is then permanently cut by the amount
to be learned z¤ that, as described in Greenwood and Jovanovic(1998) is a
function of the growth rate of vertical innovation z¤ = !(gA)º.
A rise in use costs can therefore be represented as a rise in the exogenous
component ! of the cost function. In the appendix we show that the same
kind of result applies indi®erently for the case where z is a number or the
above speci¯ed function.
By introducing a simple use cost which accelerates with the vertical
growth rate we introduce an externality e®ect on the ¯nal sector. Final
producers perceive a negative pecuniary externality from the research sector
since their costs of adoption are increased as far as innovation accelerates.
Again the result will be that the pro¯ts of both kind of innovations will be
reduced and the fraction of GDP employed in vertical and horizontal di®er-
entiation will be reduced too. Despite this simple costs are neutral from an
incentive viewpoint.
3.3 The case ° < ±
The analysis of this case can be carried out in the same way as before but
with less counterintuitive results. The solution will be now in the space
(gn,h), according to the following system of equations:
gL = gA(d ¡ 1 + ®c2h
¹) (17)
½ ¡ gL = gN
µ














Where the expression of the coe±cients can be found in the appendix of
Segerstrom(2000): here it is su±cient to say that ¹ > 0 and c2 > 0. As
8For gA = 3% and z(gA) = 0:3(gA)0:5 we get a cost of around 5% of GDP, which can be
a reasonable ¯gure: the ¯gures in this paper are all drawn by using this speci¯cation. The
reader is referred to Jovanovic(1997): costs in adoption could amount to 10% of GDP.
12shown in the following ¯gure the growth rate of horizontal innovation will
be increased by an increase in use costs despite the fact that the ratio of
GDP devoted to research is decreased. This happens for the same reason as
explained above: the decrease in the expenditure is more than compensated
by the movement in the spillover term y. In this case simple costs reduce









Figure 2: Solution of the system for simple costs
the productivity growth rate and increase the rate of variety growth: this
implies that the overall growth rate of the economy (the wage growth rate)
is decreased if and only if d < 1 ¡ ®, which is the case shown in picture 2.
Therefore even in the case ° < ± we still might get the result that a rise in
use costs is bene¯cial for economic growth.
4 Second extension: The Quasi Fixed Cost
Model
To reconciliate maths and economic intuition for any value of the returns in
R&D, we introduce quasi-¯xed costs. We will only solve the model in the
more counterintuitive case, ° > ±: the same conclusions easily apply to the
less ill-behaved situation.
As we said above, there are two e®ects to be taken into account when
13we introduce use costs: an externality e®ect and an incentive e®ect. Simple
costs are neutral from the incentive viewpoint, i.e. they do not distort the
relation between the two rewards of innovation. Now we address the question
of whether the existence of a di®erent kind of use costs may bias the process
of innovation towards the horizontal one.
Consider that at time t the ¯nal good ¯rm has paid all the costs of adop-
tion on di®erent qualities, up to the maximum level of quality At. Once a
new industry is created the monopolist in the industry produces an interme-
diate good that has a level of quality randomly chosen among all the existing
ones.
Since the ¯nal good ¯rm has already paid all the use costs on the existing
qualities, there is no reason why it should pay a use cost on the new good.
Use costs are in this sense \quasi-¯xed"9 in the sense that they are paid
proportionally to the quantity bought once the new-quality good is purchased
for the ¯rst time, but they are not paid anymore for di®erent goods of the
same quality that are produced by the new industries.
Since every industry vertical innovations moves the leading edge quality,
then an horizontal innovator, ceteris paribus, will pro¯t of an higher demand,
as far as it is not replaced by a vertical innovator, since ¯nal good ¯rms do
not pay an adoption cost. With this hypothesis we address an incentive
problem.
With quasi-¯xed costs in fact there will be an heterogeneous set of in-
termediate ¯rms. Until it is replaced, an horizontal innovator will not make
¯nal good ¯rm pay use costs: In the steady state time t equilibrium we will
have Qt industries that have never innovated in the vertical direction and
therefore produce cost-free intermediate goods. Every new industry enters
automatically in the set of Q and it escapes it as soon as an innovation arrives
with probability Át.
To formalize the argument above we assume that in steady state Q is a
constant fraction of the N ¯rms. Since all new industries start without use
costs attached to them, Q increases as far as N increases; also at any time t
there will be a number ÁtQt that will innovate and leave the group of Q. In
di®erential terms we can write:
_ Q = _ N ¡ ÁQ
If we divide both terms by Q and use the hypothesis that
Q
N = k (or in
9Another application of quasi-¯xed costs can be found in the article of Cozzi and
Spinesi(2002). Anyway they consider quasi-¯xed costs in research, so there is no economic
connection between their model and this one

















Proposition 3 The fraction of intermediate ¯rms use-cost-free will be a pos-
itive function of the rate of horizontal innovation and an inverse function of
the rate of vertical innovation.






















Where k is determined endogenously and z(gA) is meant to be the same
function as before.
The solution of this case follows the same steps as for the case of general
costs but there two main di®erences in the results. Since ¯rms are hetero-
geneous, the general equilibrium e®ect on the wage does not compensate
anymore; moreover there is an incentive e®ect as we have already explained.
In what follows we brie°y outline these results.






for the cost-free intermediate goods and





For the others. For both cases the reasoning above applies and therefore the
price will be ¯xed by following the standard rule p = w=®. The rule for
















15The drop in wage is computed as follows from the marginal productivity
of labor for ¯nal good ¯rms:






















t ®2®[(1 ¡ z)(1 ¡ k) + k]1¡®
¡1¡® (21)
Now the drop in wage corresponds to the term in square brackets. It
approximates 1 ¡ z, provided that k is small enough:
³ = (1 ¡ z)(1 ¡ k) + k = 1 ¡ z + kz
As before the rate of growth of wage is una®ected by the presence of costs.
We can conclude that:
Proposition 4 In the case of quasi ¯xed costs the arousal of heterogeneity of
¯rms implies that costs are not neutral for the optimal supply of intermediate
goods. The drop in wage in fact will under-compensate the ¯rms with costs
and over-compensate the ¯rms that are cost-free.




t (1 ¡ ®)®
¡1¡®
From the equations of the wage and of the income we can conclude that:
Proposition 5 In the case of quasi-¯xed costs, both the population growth
condition, and the iso-growth line una®ected.
Since the production of intermediate goods is a®ected by the presence of









We can compare the pro¯ts for a vertical (¼v) and an horizontal(¼h)
innovator at time t:
























Which takes into account population growth, the probability of being re-
placed by an innovator and the crowding out e®ect. This boils down to:
¦
qcost





The main di®erence from the previous case is in the general equilibrium
e®ect on the salary: we do not have a complete compensation in this case.
From an incentive viewpoint we can model the di®erence between vertical




In the case of quasi-¯xed costs the wedge between the horizontal and the
vertical di®erentiation reward is modi¯ed with respect to the no-cost case.
We show the system of equations that leads us the solution of the problem
of allocation of vertical research:
gL = gA(d ¡ 1 +
(®c1v²)
(1 ¡ z)1=1¡®(25)






















In the case of quasi-¯xed costs the R&D rotates upward more than in the
case of normal cost. This is by no means surprising since in the quasi-cost
case both heterogeneity of ¯rms and the incentive e®ect contribute to modify
the research equation.
In the quasi ¯xed costs case, we ¯nd that the combination of the exter-
nality and the incentive e®ect produce, with respect to the benchmark case,
a lower vertical growth, an higher horizontal growth and a reduced overall
growth rate. In other words, the incentive e®ect of the quasi ¯xed cost case,
o®sets the counterintuitive result we got in the simple cost case.
In general we ¯nd that:












Figure 3: Solution of the system for simple and quasi ¯xed costs
Proposition 6 With the exception of the pathological case of no vertical
innovation: i) Quasi ¯xed costs reduce the growth rate of vertical innovation
and increase the growth rate of horizontal innovation. ii) In a neighborhood
of z = 0 (the no cost case), for realistic values of the parameters ® and ½, the
resources h allocated to horizontal research will increase when z increases10
iii) Quasi ¯xed costs reduce the overall growth rate of the economy.
The reader is referred to the appendix for the proof of proposition 6,
point i) and ii). For point iii) a simple graphical argument will su±ce and it
is presented below.
In the quasi ¯xed cost case the horizontal innovation is fostered, whereas
the vertical innovation is harmed: this is the essence of point i) and ii) in the
statement above. Intuitively, in graph 3 the economy passes from point A to
point B: point B is below point A in the space v;gA by part i).
10An increase in the fraction h when z rises is a su±cient condition for the the vertical
growth rate to decrease: we can prove the argument by contradiction. Suppose that by
raising costs h increases and also gA increases. Then, since v decreases for sure when we
raise costs, it must be the case that the spillover term y in gA = ¸vv±y is increased. But
since gN = ¸hh°y holds then gN should rise too, hence the contradiction.For the necessary
part, see the Appendix.
18As before the contribution of the two innovations to the overall growth
can be assessed by looking at the intercept of the iso-growth lines11, but,
di®erently from previous cases, no matter what the slope of the iso-growth
line is, clearly the intercept of the iso-growth line passing through B is lower
than the iso-growth line passing through A: this implies that situation B has
a lower overall growth than A. This implies that in the quasi-¯xed cost case
a reduction of vertical innovation is associated to a decrease in the overall
growth rate of the economy.
5 Some conclusive remarks
In this paper we assessed the problem of use costs in scale-e®ect free endoge-
nous growth model. We have shown that in a fairly general scale e®ect free
set-up, a simple cost argument can convey counterintuitive results. In the
paper of Segerstrom this is due to two ingredients: increasing returns in the
research production function and a downward sloping condition relating the
two innovations, i.e. the population growth condition that enable us to pick
up steady states despite population growth.
While the speci¯cation of the research functions adopted in Segerstrom
(2000) might be regarded as speci¯c to the model, population growth condi-
tions should be seen as general conditions which characterize scale e®ect free
models. Despite this remark it is not entirely clear which of the two hypoth-
esis should be modi¯ed and how in order to convey the standard result that
use costs reduce the overall growth of the economy.
Therefore, instead of allowing a modi¯cation in the set-up of the model,
we imagine that the problem might be in the speci¯cation of our cost func-
tions. With this respect we consider a di®erent hypothesis: quasi ¯xed costs.
In this case use costs are attached only to the new produced qualities and
not to the new varieties that have an already existing quality.
By doing this we introduce heterogeneity among ¯rms and we a®ect the
incentives of undertaking horizontal against vertical research giving an ad-
vantage of horizontal innovation with respect the vertical one: under very
mild conditions we are able to prove that quasi ¯xed use costs reduce the
growth rate of the economy.
From an empirical viewpoint we might have no direct insight on whether
simple costs or quasi-¯xed costs apply in reality. Despite this, from a theo-
retical perspective, the quasi-¯xed cost argument could be seen as a rationale
11Also the iso-growth formula modi¯es with quasi-¯xed costs: in the picture, as a matter
of comparison, we use the iso-growth condition without quasi-¯xed costs, since they are
steeper. From a numerical viewpoint the di®erence is very small.
19for the common view that, in a creative destruction framework, what really
matters for growth are quality-enhancing activities; horizontal innovation can
be seen as \cheaper" but less e®ective innovation.
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207 Appendix: proof of proposition 6
7.1 Proof of part i)




With ! > 0 and º > 0.
We prove that a rise in the autonomous component ! never increases the
vertical growth rate: that is dgA=d! < 0.
We proceed in two steps.





































Equation 28 implies that when
dgA
dz < 0, then also
dgA
d! < 0 follows.
In the second step we consider the system:
gL = gA(d ¡ 1 +
(®c1v²)
(1 ¡ z)1=1¡®(29)






















Now we check that
dgA
dz < 0 holds 8z at the points at which condition 29







Where with j Jx;y j we de¯ne the determinant of the Jacobian matrix com-
puted with respect to the variables x;y.
Recall that since ³ = 1 ¡ z + kz, the endogenous term k, which is a
function of the vertical and horizontal growth rate, is part of our problem.
Since k is a fraction and we have monotonicity, this issue is overcome by
proving that
dgA
dz < 0 at the boundaries k = 0 and k = 1.
21Setting k = 0 the system(29,30) becomes:
gL = gA(d ¡ 1 +
(®c1v²)
(1 ¡ z)1=1¡® (32)
½ ¡ gL = gA
µ












































































Which can be reduced to an always negative expression:

















dz < 0 for k = 0.
The same argument holds for k = 1, leading to:
gL = gA(d ¡ 1 +
(®c1v²)
(1 ¡ z)1=1¡® (35)
½ ¡ gL = gA
µ













For k = 1 the sign of the Jacobian at the denominator is still negative.







































Which is equal to zero. The growth rate of vertical innovation is reduced
by quasi ¯xed costs, except when all industries in the economy do not make
22¯nal users pay costs. Nevertheless the case k = 1 is purely pathological,
implying that there is no vertical innovation at all, and can be disregarded.
Since the population growth condition applies, the decrease in vertical
innovation growth rate implies an increase in the horizontal growth rate.
This remark completes the proof of part i) of statement 6.
7.2 Part ii)












(1 ¡ z)1=1¡® (37)
The sign of dh=dz is the same as the sign of dH=dz.
We invert equation 29 in order to express v in term of gA and of the
parameters of the model and we plug the expression in 37. We compute then














) + (1 ¡ ®)
¸
(38)
From the proof of part i) we know that k = 1 implies
dgA
dz = 0. By
continuity, for some high values of z for which we are in the proximity of
k = 1,
dgA
dz can be arbitrarily low. Therefore we restrict ourselves to the
neighborhood of z = 0.
According to 38 a su±cient condition for dH




j> 1 ¡ ®
































We now de¯ne D1 as an upper bound of D that is computed by noting










Since we are considering the economy close to the zero cost case and








In the data v and gA are in hundredths of GDP, whereas " = 1¡±
1¡°° ¡ ± is
hardly smaller than 0:1. The two innovation rates are roughly comparable
as dimension12. Then the condition D2 < 1 is hardly a restriction at all.
The inequality 1 > D2 > D1 > D establishes the result.
12A few numerical simulations are also available on request
24